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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Free trade agreements (FTAs) are “one of the best ways to open up 
foreign markets to U.S. exporters.”1  Aimed at “protect[ing] U.S. interests 
and enhanc[ing] the rule of law in the FTA partner countr[ies],” the 
agreements have the capacity to create “stable and transparent trading” 
environments and have proved ostensibly popular in the marketplace, given 
that a substantial percentage of the United States’ international trade takes 
place with nations which has are co-parties to such agreements.2  
Accordingly, the Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade 
Agreement (CAFTA),3 initiated by President George W. Bush in 2002 and 
later approved in 2005, “place[d] the United States in a ‘free trade’ zone with 
Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Costa Rica, Nicaragua and the 
Dominican Republic” in order to “reduce tariffs, limit import quotas[,] and 
increase legal protections for foreign investors.”4  Despite these intended 
benefits, CAFTA, like its predecessor, the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA),5 has been roundly criticized for its role in outsourcing 
jobs to nations with curtailed labor representation and unionization6 and for 
allowing private corporations to undermine—or even dictate—host nations’ 
environmental policy choices.7  Just as legal scholars criticized CAFTA’s 
environmental protection in the wake of its ratification,8 Pacific Rim Mining 
Corporation (Pac Rim) has recently cited arbitration arising under NAFTA’s 
investor protection provisions as precedent in order to sue the Republic of El 
Salvador for disallowing the continued exploration and mining of precious 
                                                                                                                   
 1 Free Trade Agreements, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE – INT’L TRADE ADMIN., http://trade. 
gov/fta/ (last visited June 30, 2012). 
 2 Id. (“Forty-one percent of U.S. goods exports went to FTA partner countries in 2010, 
with exports to those countries growing at a faster rate than exports to the rest of the world 
from 2009 to 2010, 23% vs. 20%.”).  
 3 Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement, 109 P.L. 53, 119 Stat. 462 
(2005) [hereinafter CAFTA], available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-ag 
reements/cafta-dr-dominican-republic-central-america-fta/final-text. 
 4 Don McIntosh, CAFTA Fight Boils Down to Who Will Benefit in Trade, NW. LAB. PRESS 
(May 20, 2005), http://www.nwlaborpress.org/2005/5-20-05CAFTA.html. 
 5 North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 
(1993) [hereinafter NAFTA]. 
 6 McIntosh, supra note 4. 
 7 Randal C. Archibold, First a Gold Rush, Then the Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2011, 
at A6. 
 8 See Vivian H.W. Wang, Note, Investor Protection or Environmental Protection? 
“Green” Development under CAFTA, 32 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 251, 282 (2007) (“While 
Annex 10-C.4(b) of CAFTA was intended to protect legitimate public welfare objectives from 
being deemed indirect expropriation, nothing in CAFTA seems to change the result under 
cases like Metalclad.”). 
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metals within its national boundaries.9  This suit, and others like it, may not 
only impact host nations monetarily, but may also generate civil unrest 
throughout a region that is still recovering from a protracted era of violent 
repression and internal conflict.10  The Pac Rim suit also demonstrates that 
CAFTA protects foreign corporate investment at the expense of host nations’ 
policy-making autonomy and that CAFTA’s imbalance is most pronounced 
within the environmental context.   
This Note argues that CAFTA’s investor protection provisions fail to set a 
reliable expropriation standard, that CAFTA lacks an adequate mechanism to 
prevent forum shopping, that CAFTA environmental protection provisions 
are substantively and procedurally deficient, and that these failures operate in 
concert to offer overly broad protection for investment interests eviscerating 
progress on environmental protection in the process.  It will address the 
various CAFTA provisions that enable private corporations to dictate the 
environmental policies of host nations, and accordingly, attempt to respond 
to recent questions regarding what may be done to counter FTAs’ chilling 
effects on environmental progress generally.11  In doing so, this Note will 
survey the substantive and procedural mechanisms proposed by legal 
scholars to maximize the environmental policy making autonomy of 
CAFTA’s host nations, as well as other relevant practices that may be 
employed to achieve similar ends in the FTA context.  The following 
sections will discuss: CAFTA’s creation and the policy concerns expressed 
leading up to its ratification, the procedural and substantive shortcomings by 
which the agreement’s investor protection and environmental protection 
language is marred, and what incremental changes might be made via a side 
agreement in order to shore up these insufficiencies.  
II.  THE DISPUTE 
Pac Rim acquired rights to explore El Salvador’s El Dorado mine, which 
is speculated to contain a substantial amount of gold, in 2002 as result of a 
                                                                                                                   
 9 Archibold, supra note 7. 
 10 McIntosh, supra note 4.  
 11 See Katie Zaunbrecher, Note, Pac Rim Cayman v. Republic of El Salvador: Confronting 
Free Trade’s Chilling Effect on Environmental Progress in Latin America, 33 HOUS. J. INT’L 
L. 489, 502 (2011).  
How much of an incursion on sovereign authority is acceptable when 
economic development and foreign trade are on the line? Should future FTAs 
provide the investor-state dispute resolution loophole that allowed the 
strategic maneuvering mastered by Pacific Rim/Pac Rim? And at what point 
do FTAs stop paying lip service to environmental aspirations and actually 
start achieving them? 
Id.  
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merger with Dayton Mining Corp., which had begun exploring the region in 
the early 1990s.12  Despite Pac Rim’s eagerness to commence the extraction 
process, it has yet to do so due to the Salvadoran government’s refusal to 
issue exploitation permits.13  Citing an unsatisfactory Environmental Impact 
Assessment, the government denied the permits because of the harm already 
wrought upon the area due to earlier mining efforts and the prediction of 
possible devastating effects if mining resumed.14  Of particular concern was 
the risk of toxic spills associated with the company’s plan to use large 
amounts of cyanide in the exploration process.  The detoxification process in 
case of a spill would significantly deplete the Rio Lempa river, the only 
source of clean water within the area.15  By invoking CAFTA’s investor 
protection language, Pac Rim filed what is essentially a regulatory takings 
claim in an international investment court seeking $77 million in damages.16  
This case is one of many claims brought in recent years by corporations 
against Latin American nations, as foreign investors seeking to strike it big 
come to the region for oil, gas, and mineral deposits.17     
III.  CAFTA: BACKGROUND 
A.  Political Concerns Surrounding CAFTA’s Passage   
CAFTA, like its predecessor NAFTA, was created for the purpose of 
“reduc[ing] tariffs, limit[ing] import quotas and increas[ing] legal protections 
for foreign investors.”18  CAFTA was seen, at the time of its negotiation, as 
an incremental step towards then-President George W. Bush’s “ultimate goal 
of a Free Trade Area of the Americas . . . that would potentially include 
thirty-four economies within the Western Hemisphere.”19  Despite the 
President’s enthusiasm and the United States Trade Representative’s 
                                                                                                                   
 12 Krista Scheffey, Pacific Rim v. El Salvador and the Perils of Free Trade in the Americas, 
COUNCIL ON HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS (July 30, 2010), http://www.coha.org/pacific-rim-v-el-sal 
vador-and-the-perils-of-free-trade-in-the-americas/. 
 13 Id. 
 14 Id.  
 15 Id. 
 16 Archibold, supra note 7. 
 17 Id. 
 18 McIntosh, supra note 4; see also Paulette L. Stenzel, Free Trade and Sustainability 
Through the Lens of Nicaragua: How CAFTA-DR Should Be Amended to Promote the Triple 
Bottom Line, 34 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 653, 675 (2010) (discussing how 
tariffs on certain goods such as automobiles, textiles, and electronics are eliminated, phased 
out, or retained in order to reduce barriers to trade). 
 19 Nathaniel Hemmerick Hunt, Note, One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: The Central 
American Free Trade Agreement and the Environment, 35 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 545, 546 
(2007). 
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assurances that by fostering foreign direct investment (FDI), CAFTA would 
lead to higher environmental and labor standards within the host nations.20 
The proposal was met with considerable animus by both sides of the aisle in 
Washington.21  Many members of Congress believed CAFTA would 
replicate the problems for domestic jobs, international labor, and 
environmental policy that were inherent in NAFTA.22  For example, while 
supporters pointed to CAFTA as an opportunity to reaffirm and expand upon 
the alleged successes of NAFTA, for some Republicans representing districts 
heavily invested in manufacturing, textile, and sugar-production, the 
agreement was perceived as a threat to American labor. They feared that U.S. 
companies would be encouraged to outsource domestic jobs in order to 
capture the benefit of the much lower wage expectations of citizens of the 
host nations.23  In addition to sharing some of their Republican counterparts’ 
fear of CAFTA’s impact on the American workforce, Democrats premised 
their opposition on the environmental and human rights degradations they 
felt would likely ensue as result of the pact.24  
Ultimately, CAFTA passed in the Senate by a vote of 54 to 45 on June 
30, 2005.25  Further, after some hard bargaining and quid pro quo 
concessions on particular textile manufacturing and importation interests, 
CAFTA was passed on July 28, 2005 by a margin of two votes in the House 
of Representatives.26  This narrow passage came amidst accusations by 
Democrats that Republican leaders had “[bought] votes and forc[ed] 
members to vote against their consciences” in order to push the trade pact 
through a wary legislative body.27  Thus, after passing expeditiously, albeit 
narrowly, through both the House and Senate, CAFTA was signed on August 
2, 2005 by President Bush and officially debuted between nations in early 
2006.28 
                                                                                                                   
 20 Office of United States Trade Representative, Final Environmental Review of the 
Dominican Republic – Central America – United State Free Trade Agreement 29 (2005), 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/131461.pdf [hereinafter Final Environmental 
Review]. 
 21 Paul Blustein, CAFTA Wins Approval From Senate, WASH. POST, July 1, 2005, at D5. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Edmund L. Andrews, Pleas and Promises by G.O.P. As Trade Pact Wins by 2 Votes, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2005, at A1; see also Stenzel, supra note 18, at 683 (noting that host 
nation Nicaragua’s minimum daily wage was $1.86 at the time of the article’s publication). 
 24 See, e.g., Barack Obama, Why I Oppose CAFTA, CHI. TRIB., at 27 (“[CAFTA] does 
less . . . than previous trade agreements, and does little to address enforcement of basic 
environmental standards in the [host nations].”). 
 25 Blustein, supra note 21. 
 26 See Andrews, supra note 23 (“Representative Nancy Pelosi . . . accused Republican 
leaders of trading anything they had to get the votes they needed.”). 
 27 Id. 
 28 Stenzel, supra note 18, at 656; Mark Drajem, Bush Signs CAFTA, Capping 19-Month 
Drive for the Trade Accord, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 4, 2012, 2:50 PM), http://www.bloomberg. 
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B.  The Model BIT 
Although structured multilaterally, CAFTA’s Chapter 10 may sometimes 
be referred to as a bilateral investment treaty, or “BIT.”29  “BIT” is a catchall 
term used to describe a type of treaty that obligates subject nations to “grant 
investors from the other[s] certain protections to their investments in the 
foreign country.”30  This term is particularly fitting, given that the language 
of CAFTA Chapter 10 is culled directly from the U.S. Model BIT (Model 
BIT),31 which “serves as a template for the investment chapters of free trade 
agreements.”32  Before reviewing the CAFTA/Model BIT provisions 
pertinent to this Note, for the sake of context, it is worth mentioning that, 
despite the human rights and environmental benefits that free-market 
proponents suggest flow naturally from the liberalization of international 
trade,33 it is relatively well established that the primary objective of BITs is 
to generate and protect FDI by developed nations’ corporations within 
developing nations’ borders.34  As such, other benefits generally thought of 
as humanitarian in nature, such as enhanced labor or environmental 
protections, should realistically be understood as incidental to the strictly 
economic benefits sought after by the parties to such agreements. 
IV.  INVESTOR PROTECTION UNDER CHAPTER 10 
A.  Three Important Provisions 
“Investment” under CAFTA’s Chapter 10 is, as noted above, derived 
from the 2004 Model BIT35 and is the product of a 2002 congressional 
mandate directing U.S. trade negotiators to modify the language of future 
free trade agreements in order to curb the United States’ potential exposure 
to foreign investor suits.36  Three key provisions within CAFTA’s Chapter 10 
                                                                                                                   
com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=agWOlIZcvoHQ&refer=latin_america. 
 29 See, e.g., Amy K. Anderson, Note, Individual Rights and Investor Protections in a Trade 
Regime: NAFTA and CAFTA, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1057, 1083 (2006) (referring to 
CAFTA’s Chapter 10 as a BIT). 
 30 Anthony B. Sanders, Of All Things Made in America Why Are We Exporting the Penn 
Central Test?, 30 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 339, 343 (2010).  
 31 Compare CAFTA, supra note 3, ch. 10, with 2004 Model BIT, U.S. DEP’T ST. [hereinafter 
Model BIT], available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/117601.pdf. 
 32 Labor and Trade Program: The Language of International Trade, SIERRA CLUB, http:// 
www.sierraclub.org/trade/globalization/language.aspx (last visited July 12, 2012). 
 33 Final Environmental Review, supra note 20, at 29. 
 34 Sanders, supra note 30, at 347.  
 35 Compare CAFTA, supra note 3, ch. 10, with Model BIT, supra note 31. 
 36 Sanders, supra note 30, at 358–59. 
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are National Treatment,37 Minimum Standard of Treatment,38 and 
Expropriation and Compensation.39  These provisions are designed to offer 
protection to investors, which in turn, expose nations to varied degrees of 
potential liability in dealing with foreign corporations.40  The National 
Treatment provision essentially requires that host nations treat foreign 
investors in a manner “no less favorable than . . . it [treats] its own 
investors.”41   This provision carries little threat to nations and does little to 
change the status quo with respect to trading in the region because Latin 
American nations have followed such a standard for some time.42  CAFTA’s 
Minimum Standard of Treatment provision requires host nations to provide 
foreign investors with “fair and equitable treatment and full protection and 
security” in accordance with “customary international law.”43  The usage of 
the qualifier “customary” in the 2004 Model BIT, and thus CAFTA, to 
describe the application of “international law” in adjudicating disputes of this 
nature was intended to preclude consideration of other treaties or even other 
provisions within the Agreement.44  That has a potential dampening effect on 
the likelihood of a foreign investor prevailing on an expropriation claim 
arising under this Article.45  On the other hand, as demonstrated by 
NAFTA’s track record,46 the Expropriations and Compensation provision 
has, far more teeth than its counterparts in the Model BIT, and thus merits 
greater attention.   
CAFTA’s Expropriations and Compensation provision provides roughly 
the same investor protections as those found in NAFTA’s homonymously 
titled Chapter 1110.47  The effect of these chapters is that if a constituent 
                                                                                                                   
 37 CAFTA, supra note 3, art. 10.3. 
 38 Id. art. 10.5. 
 39 Id. art. 10.7.  
 40 Id. arts. 10.3, 10.5, 10.7. 
 41 Id. art. 10.3.1. 
 42 Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A Brief History of International Investment Agreements, 12 U.C. 
DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 157, 159 (2005) (“Latin American countries adhered to the Calvo 
doctrine, under which foreign investors were entitled only to the treatment that the host 
country afforded to its own investors.”). 
 43 CAFTA, supra note 3, art. 10.5.1. 
 44 Sanders, supra note 30, at 356–57. 
 45 Stephen Fietta, Most Favoured Nation Treatment and Dispute Resolution Under 
Bilateral Investment Treaties: A Turning Point?, 8 INT’L ARB. L. REV. 131, 137 (2005) 
(discussing the danger of allowing foreign investors to replace “dispute resolution provisions 
in the basic treaty with more advantageous provisions contained within another of the 
respondent state’s BITs”). 
 46 See Metalclad v. United Mexican States, ICSID (Additional Facility) 40 I.L.M. 36 (2000) 
[hereinafter Metalclad decision]; Methanex Corporation v. United States of America, 
(NAFTA/UNCITRAL Aug. 3, 2005) (Final Award), 44 I.L.M. 1345 (2005) (awarding private 
corporations significant sums in response to claims arising under the provision).  
 47 Compare CAFTA, supra note 3, art. 10.7, with NAFTA, supra note 5, ch. 1110. 
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government “expropriates an investment[,] the government must provide 
some measure of monetary compensation to the investor.”48  Two types of 
expropriations, direct and indirect, are protected against and are analyzed 
along the lines of U.S. Fifth Amendment takings jurisprudence.49  A 
government directly expropriates when it takes the tangible or intangible 
property of a foreign investor via nationalization, i.e., “transfer of title or 
outright seizure.”50  On the other hand, a government indirectly expropriates 
the property of a foreign investor by taking some action along the lines of 
those identified in U.S. regulatory takings jurisprudence.51  In the latter 
context, CAFTA’s language differs ever so slightly from NAFTA’s as result 
of the effort, noted above,52 to stem the United States’ potential liability 
exposure to foreign investors.  The difference is that NAFTA’s Article 1110 
prohibits a nation from taking any “measure tantamount to nationalization or 
expropriation,” whereas CAFTA’s Article 10.7 prohibits such measures that 
are “equivalent to expropriation or nationalization.”53  The reasoning behind 
the change in terminology stemmed from legislators’ and legal scholars’ 
concerns that arbitral panels might “interpret ‘tantamount’ expansively to 
mean something much less than ‘expropriation.’ ”54  These concerns have 
been proven unfounded over time.55  Alas, while the language of CAFTA’s 
expropriation provision is, in effect, simply more of the same, a key 
difference between the two can be found within its supplementary text.   
Article 10.7 of CAFTA is to be read in light of Annexes 10-B and 10-C to 
the Agreement, the latter of which further sets apart CAFTA’s indirect 
expropriation language from that of NAFTA, beyond just the “tantamount-
equivalent” distinction.56  Annex 10-C more thoroughly expounds upon the 
indirect expropriation cause of action than NAFTA by setting forth a series 
of standards to assess such claims.57  Specifically, Annex 10-C states that, in 
the instance of an alleged indirect expropriation:  
                                                                                                                   
 48 Sanders, supra note 30, at 357–58. 
 49 Wang, supra note 8, at 261; see also U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private 
property be taken for public use without just compensation.”). 
 50 CAFTA, supra note 3, Annex 10-C. 
 51 See, e.g., Lucas v. S. Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (requiring the 
government to compensate a private landowner for the deprivation of all economically 
beneficial use as result of environmental regulation imposed on subject property).  
 52 See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
 53 Compare NAFTA, supra note 5, ch. 1110, with CAFTA, supra note 3, art. 10.7.1 
(emphasis added). 
 54 Sanders, supra note 30, at 360. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Stephen J. Byrnes, Balancing Investor Rights and Environmental Protection in Investor-
State Dispute Settlement Under CAFTA: Lessons from the NAFTA Legitimacy Crisis, 8 U.C. 
DAVIS BUS. L.J. 103 (2007).  
 57 CAFTA, supra note 3, Annex 10-C, ¶ 4(a)–(b). 
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(a) The determination of whether an action or series of 
actions by a Party, in a specific fact situation, constitutes 
an indirect expropriation requires a case-by-case, fact-
based inquiry that considers, among other factors: 
(i) the economic impact of the government action, 
although the fact that an action or series of actions by 
a Party has an adverse effect on the economic value 
of an investment, standing alone, does not establish 
that an indirect expropriation has occurred; 
(ii) the extent to which the government action interferes 
with distinct, reasonable investment-backed 
expectations; and 
(iii) the character of the government action. 
(b) Except in rare circumstances, nondiscriminatory 
regulatory actions by a Party that are designed and applied 
to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as 
public health, safety, and the environment, do not 
constitute indirect expropriations.58  
Essentially, when an indirect expropriation (the international customary 
law analog to a regulatory taking) is alleged, CAFTA has explicitly 
incorporated the regulatory takings analysis established by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York.59  The Penn 
Central test was included at the insistence of the Central American 
governments.60  On its face, the Penn Central test should inure to the benefit 
of nations seeking to retain policy setting autonomy, given that in the United 
States private property owners seldom prevail in regulatory takings actions.61  
Subsection (b) likewise is seemingly intended to allay concerns that foreign 
property owners might have a better chance at winning such a case under the 
Agreement than a domestic business or private individual property owner 
would against the U.S. government, by stating that indirect expropriation will 
rarely be found absent discriminatory regulatory actions taken by a party.62   
Although the newly prescribed Penn Central test and subsequent proviso 
as to the prospective rate of occurrences (in nondiscriminatory 
circumstances) may, at first glance, appear significantly favorable to nations 
                                                                                                                   
 58 Id.  
 59 Zaunbrecher, supra note 11, at 494; Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 
U.S. 104 (1978).  
 60 Zaunbrecher, supra note 11, at 494. 
 61 See Mark W. Cordes, The Effect of Palazzolo v. Rhode Island on Takings and 
Environmental Land Use Regulation, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 337, 340 (2003) (“[T]he Penn 
Central test is itself quite protective of government regulatory interest. . . .”). 
 62 CAFTA, supra note 3, Annex 10-C.  
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looking to further human rights and environmental protection policies, they 
are vulnerable to interpretations that cut the other way.  First, there is an 
argument that, within the United States, suits successfully litigated pursuant 
to the Penn Central test are less than “rarely” won.63  A study conducted as 
part of the 2003 Duke University Environmental Law and Policy Forum 
indicated that, when the Penn Central test was used to assess regulatory 
takings claims, “owners prevailed in 13.4% of the cases where the merits 
were addressed and in 9.8% of all one hundred and thirty-three cases” 
analyzed as part of the study.64  Using this data, legal scholar Anthony B. 
Sanders suggests that phrases such as “extremely uncommon” or “very 
unlikely” better describe the pattern of regulatory takings holdings in favor 
of private property owners and that the term “rare” as it is used in Annex 10-
C might encompass greater, not fewer, instances in which an indirect 
expropriation has occurred than would be the case had such claims arisen 
between the U.S. government and its own constituents.65  A second argument 
is that the test is being used out of context.  The Penn Central test is intended 
to reign in the arbitral panels’ “carte blanche review a la that imputed to the 
Lochner court in deciding what is in the interest of the public welfare.”66  
The test is applied out of the context of the case law and constitutional 
principles of the United States, where it is derived; thus, in reality, panels 
will not be assisted by the test in making their assessments.67  Accordingly, 
arbitral panels may, in the absence of a meaningful case-based framework 
for applying the Penn Central test, simply rely upon the reasoning of 
decisions arising under NAFTA’s Chapter 1110,68 which have been more 
generous to businesses than U.S. courts would be under a traditional takings 
analysis.69 
The harbinger of this phenomenon was the landmark case Metalclad 
Corp. v. United Mexican States.70  It is no surprise, then, that Pac Rim 
Cayman cited Metalclad as precedent for its case against the Salvadoran 
government.71  In Metalclad, a California company, relying on NAFTA’s 
                                                                                                                   
 63 Cordes, supra note 61, at 364. 
 64 F. Patrick Hubbard et al., Do Owners Have a Fair Chance of Prevailing Under the Ad 
Hoc Regulatory Takings Test of Penn Central Transportation Company?, 14 DUKE ENVTL. L. 
& POL’Y F. 121, 141 (2003). 
 65 Sanders, supra note 30, at 364. 
 66 Id. at 365. 
 67 Hunt, supra note 19, at 570. 
 68 See Rachel D. Edsell, Note, Indirect Expropriation under NAFTA and DR-CAFTA: 
Potential Inconsistencies in the Treatment of State Public Welfare Regulations, 86 B.U. L. 
REV. 931, 962 (noting that, in the absence of clear and practicable standards, investment 
tribunal decisions often turn to prior NAFTA tribunals for their “persuasive power”). 
 69 Hunt, supra note 19, at 571.  
 70 Metalclad decision, supra note 46. 
 71 Archibold, supra note 7. 
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investor provisions, successfully sued the Mexican government for allegedly 
“thwart[ing] its efforts to build a hazardous waste treatment plant despite 
assurances . . . that it would get the needed permits.”72  In addition to 
damages totaling in excess of $16 million,73 the Metalclad decision delivered 
a shift in paradigm.74  Investor-state disputes, hitherto largely thought of as a 
way by which investors could ward off “the barrage of expropriations that 
occurred in Third World nationalization of industries during the Cold 
War,”75 were transformed into an aggressive gambit employed by investors 
in order to induce host nations to relax their labor and environmental 
policies.76 
B.  Arbitral Channels, Procedure, and the Problem of “Treaty-Shopping” 
Under CAFTA, should a foreign investor decide to pursue compensation 
from a host nation in connection with an alleged Chapter 10 violation under 
the Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) provision, it may do so  
(a) under the ICSID Convention and the ICSID Rules of 
Procedures for Arbitration Proceedings, provided that both the 
respondent and the Party of the claimant are parties to the 
ICSID Convention; (b) under the ICSID Additional Facility 
Rules, provided that either the respondent or the Party of the 
claimant is a party to the ICSID Convention; or (c) under the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.77   
The inclusion of an ISDS-type mechanism within a BIT was first adopted in 
NAFTA78 and was heralded as an advancement in the resolution of 
international trade disputes as it “grant[ed] individual foreign investors 
standing to sue host governments without requiring the participation or 
acquiescence of the investor’s home government . . . .”79   
                                                                                                                   
 72 Id. 
 73 Metalclad decision, supra note 46.  
 74 Sanders, supra note 30, at 358. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Int’l Inst. for Sustainable Dev., Private Rights, Public Problems: A Guide to NAFTA’s 
Controversial Chapter on Investment Rights 16 (2001),  available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/ 
trade_citizensguide.pdf (“Threats to use Chapter 11 are now a routine lobbying instrument, 
and are given added impact by the broad scope tribunals have given the obligations in the 
initial cases.”); see also Zaunbrecher, supra note 11, at 490–91 (noting that Metalclad opened 
the door for indirect expropriations claims arising out of enactments of a “legitimate domestic 
environmental policy”). 
 77 CAFTA, supra note 3, arts. 10.16.3(a)–(c). 
 78 NAFTA, supra note 5, ch. 1110. 
 79 Wang, supra note 8, at 260. 
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The advantage to foreign investors extended even further in CAFTA as it 
not only includes NAFTA’s array of available fora for resolving disputes, but 
also follows suit in omitting that which NAFTA crucially lacks, namely, a 
strict nationality standard.80  The result of this omission is that it allows a 
multinational corporation to “change nationality or assert a different 
nationality,” in order to “challenge generally applicable domestic 
environmental law[s]” of a host nation, despite what would be that 
corporations would ordinarily lack of standing based on their actual principal 
place of business.81  An example of this type of posturing is found in the case 
of Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States,82 wherein a Reno, Nevada-based 
mining company “claim[ed] to be a Canadian foreign investor under NAFTA 
in order to file a challenge over a mining claim available only to U.S. 
residents that it had acquired through its domestic subsidiary.”83  Despite the 
transparent, pretextual basis upon which Glamis Gold asserted jurisdiction, 
the case was actually permitted to proceed. 
Pac Rim Cayman’s investor suit against the Salvadoran government 
further demonstrates the viability of this notion.  Despite the nominal 
character of the U.S.-based subsidiary Pac Rim established in order to 
circumvent the host nation’s courts and the longstanding U.S. policy against 
extending treaty rights to “third-party entities that may only as a matter of 
formality be entitled to the benefits of a particular agreement,” the 
corporation is being permitted to pursue its claim through ICSID 
arbitration.84   
For years, nations have sought to curtail the availability of this type of 
maneuver, commonly referred to as “treaty shopping,” but the scope of these 
effort has largely been limited to the issue of tax evasion.85  In the FTA 
context, the failure to impose stringent anti-treaty-shopping measures may 
                                                                                                                   
 80 See generally NAFTA, supra note 5. 
 81 Judith Wallace, Note, Corporate Nationality, Investment Protection Agreements, and 
Challenges to Domestic Natural Resources Law: The Implication of Glamis Gold’s NAFTA 
Chapter 11 Claim, 17 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 365, 366 (2005).   
 82 Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States, Notice of Arbitration (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 
Dec. 9, 2003), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/27320.pdf.  
 83 Todd Tucker, NAFTA Bullet Dodged in Flawed Glamis Case; Severe Threats Remain, PUB. 
CITIZEN (June 9, 2009, 3:31 PM), http://citizen.typepad.com/eyesontrade/2009/06/nafta-bullet-do 
dged-in-flawed-glamis-case-severe-threats-remain.html. 
 84 Pac Rim Cayman, L.L.C. v. Republic of El Salvador, Submission of the United States of 
America, 2 (CAFTA Ch. 10 Arb. Trib. May 20, 2011) [hereinafter Submission of the United 
States], available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/164308.pdf. 
 85 For instance, under NAFTA an entity must pass several threshold tests involving 
calculable criteria before availing itself to beneficial tax treatment, whereas no such tests 
apply to establishing jurisdiction when adjudicating investor-state disputes.  See Simone M. 
Haug, The United States Policy of Stringent Anti-Treaty-Shopping Provisions: A Comparative 
Analysis, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 191, 247 (1996). 
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reflect concerns expressed within the realm of tax treaties as to “the fact that 
compliance complexity, or the fear of not qualifying for treaty benefits may 
deter incoming investment.”86  On the other hand, it may reflect imbalances 
in negotiating power, which sometimes means all “interests are not 
adequately represented at the bargaining table” when FTAs are executed.87  
The Pac Rim case seems to reinforce the idea that poorer host nations, in an 
effort to attract and retain foreign direct investment, tend to shy away from 
the treaty-shopping issue. Notwithstanding the aforementioned policy of 
barring shell corporations’ access to investor tribunals,88 El Salvador has yet 
to challenge the jurisdictional basis of the suit.89   
Having covered the protections afforded to investors under CAFTA, a 
look at how the agreement aims to ensure host nations protect the 
environment will be necessary.   
V.  ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION UNDER CHAPTER 17  
Largely in response to concerns regarding the long-term environmental 
impacts created by NAFTA in Mexico, subsequent FTAs entered into by the 
United States have typically included an environmental chapter.90  As part of 
this trend, CAFTA’s Chapter 17 addresses the member nations’ obligations 
to protect the environment through regulatory enforcement,91 and was 
described by the United States Trade Representative as “the most forward-
leaning trade and environment package ever.”92  Despite the appearance of 
“encourage[ing] high levels of environmental protection,”93 key omissions in 
the Chapter’s language, the drawn out enforcement process, and an absence 
of meaningful sanctions in the event of a violation make it relatively 
feckless, perhaps by design.94 
                                                                                                                   
 86 Id. at 278. 
 87 Hunt, supra note 19, at 548.  
 88 Submission of the United States, supra note 84, at 2. 
 89 See Pac Rim Cayman, L.L.C. v. Republic of El Salvador, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/12, 
Respondent’s Preliminary Objections, ¶ 7 (Jan. 4, 2010), available at http://www.minec.gob. 
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 92 Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement: Hearing Before the 
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Subcommittee Hearing – Vargo] (prepared statement of Regina K. Vargo, Assistant United 
States Trade Rep. for the Americas). 
 93 CAFTA, supra note 3, art. 17.1. 
 94 See Mark B. Baker, No Country Left Behind: The Exporting of U.S. Legal Norms Under 
the Guise of Economic Integration, 19 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1321, 1368 (2005) (“While 
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A.  Substantive Shortfalls  
Article 17.1 of CAFTA states:  
 Recognizing the right of each Party to establish its own 
levels of domestic environmental protection and environmental 
development policies and priorities, and to adopt or modify 
accordingly its environmental laws and policies, each Party 
shall ensure that its laws and policies provide for and 
encourage high levels of environmental protection, and shall 
strive to continue to improve those laws and policies.95   
Article 17.2.1(a), which is the enforceable provision of Chapter 17,96 
asserts that “[a] Party shall not fail to effectively enforce its environmental 
laws, through a sustained or recurring course of action or inaction, in a 
manner affecting trade between the Parties, after the date of entry into force 
of this Agreement.”97  In an expression of deference toward each party’s 
respective environmental policy choices, Article 17.2.1(b) establishes that 
each nation “retains the right to exercise discretion with respect to 
investigatory, prosecutorial, regulatory, and compliance matters and to make 
decisions regarding the allocation of resources to enforcement with respect to 
other environmental matters determined to have higher priorities.”98  While 
this latter provision appears to reinforce the parties’ policy making 
autonomy, in practice it might detract from environmental protection efforts 
in several ways.  First, this language arguably qualifies the Article 17.1 
admonition that each nation “ ‘ensure’ substantial environmental 
enforcement and protection . . .,”99 with the effect that the responsibilities 
described in the Chapter become a matter of discretion.100  Even if this 
phrase does not qualify 17.1, because 17.2.1(a) is the only enforceable 
provision within the Chapter, language throughout it stating that “countries 
should not weaken domestic environmental laws . . . and should ensure the 
availability of fair and efficient judicial and administrative fora to sanction 
violations of environmental law” is purely aspirational and without legal 
                                                                                                                   
negotiators claim that CAFTA only creates rights and obligations in this area which mirror 
current U.S. Supreme Court decisions, environmental groups fear that the Agreement reduces 
the permissible level of governmental regulation in environmental matters.”). 
 95 CAFTA, supra note 3, art. 17.1. 
 96 Id. art. 17.10.7 (“No Party may have recourse to dispute settlement under this Agreement 
for any matter arising under any provision of this Chapter other than Article 17.2.1(a).”). 
 97 Id. art. 17.2.1(a). 
 98 Id. art. 17.2.1(b). 
 99 Hunt, supra note 19, at 556. 
 100 Id. at 557. 
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effect.101  Further undercutting the parties’ obligations is the fact that under 
Article 17.2.1(a), a party has violated such obligations only if its actions 
constitute a “sustained or recurring course of action or inaction.”102  Thus, an 
isolated violation of Chapter 17, “regardless of how egregious,” would 
presumably be insulated from review.103   
Because Chapter 17 looks to the parties to enforce their existing 
regulatory standards, what is also missing in Chapter 17 is a set of standards 
that would at least set a threshold for future policy choices.104  In contrast to 
the Penn Central test under Chapter 10, which at least provides a universally 
applicable ceiling above which a regulatory action might constitute 
expropriation,105 Chapter 17 lacks a corollary floor below which nations 
would be deemed to have failed in “encourage[ing] high levels of 
environmental protection . . . .”106  “[T]he fact that only existing 
environmental laws fall under the Agreement means that there is currently 
very little to enforce”107 within the host nations, who tend to have weak 
environmental protection laws on their books.108  Accordingly, a common 
concern among environmentalists is that the deferential manner in which this 
Chapter was drafted, although intended to encourage environmental 
protection, will in the long run actually aggravate the problem of 
environmental degradation throughout the region.109 
Even if the host nations’ environmental laws were adequate and 
sufficiently enforced, there is a specific carve out in Chapter 17 that not only 
allows the host nations to relax such laws, but also seemingly encourages 
                                                                                                                   
 101 See Wang, supra note 8, at 271 (discussing CAFTA article 17.2.2 in particular). 
 102 CAFTA, supra note 3, art. 17.2(1)(a). 
 103 Hunt, supra note 19, at 556. 
 104 Id. at 557. 
 105 CAFTA, supra note 3, Annex 10-C. 
 106 Id. art. 17.1; see also Baker, supra note 94, at 1365–70 (discussing the United States’ 
grafting its own jurisprudential understandings of investor protection onto CAFTA but 
declining to export domestic environmental and labor standards). 
 107 Benjamin W. Jenkins, Comment, The Next Generation of Chilling Uncertainty: Indirect 
Expropriation under CAFTA and Its Potential Impact on Environmental Protection, 12 
OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 269, 282 (2007). 
 108 See Office of the United States Trade Representative, Interim Environmental Review: 
United States-Central America Free Trade Agreement 30, 31 (2003) [hereinafter Interim 
Environmental Review], available at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/CAFTA%20inter 
im%20review.pdf (discussing the lack of existing environmental laws in force among some 
host nations). 
 109 Stenzel, supra note 18, at 698; see also Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade 
Agreement: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Prot. 109th 
Cong. 107 (2005) [hereinafter Subcommittee Hearing – Waskow] (“Most countries in the 
region have disjointed and underfunded policies that have led to severe environmental 
degradation.  [CAFTA] would only exacerbate the existing problems in the region. . . .” 
(testimony of David F. Waskow, Director of the International Program, Friends of the Earth)). 
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them to do so by virtue of the Chapter 10 consequences they might otherwise 
face.  Specifically, the term “ ‘environmental law’ does not include any 
statute or regulation, or provision thereof, the primary purpose of which is 
managing the commercial harvest or exploitation…of natural resources.”110  
This not only facilitates the loosening of standards in order to attract foreign 
investors engaged in exploitative industries, but also means that “government 
efforts to manage the oil extraction, mining, and timbers sectors would not 
be enforceable environmental law, and thus could be challenged by investors 
seeking to enter natural resource markets.”111  Describing how this language 
relates to Chapter 10, in a 2007 student note, Vivian Wang looked at a 
dispute between Texas-based oil company Harken Energy Corporation and 
the Costa Rican government regarding the latter’s moratorium on oil 
exploration and certain types of mining activities within its borders due to 
environmental concerns.112  Echoing existing legal scholarship on the matter, 
Wang contemplated that, had CAFTA been in effect at the time of the 
dispute, Harken likely would have been able to rely upon Chapter 10 as 
guaranteeing protection against indirect expropriation.113  On the other hand, 
she reasoned that, pursuant to Chapter 17’s exclusionary language, the Costa 
Rican government would be left without a basis for its decision to stem 
further environmental degradation caused by “commercial harvest or 
exploitation” industries.114  Pac Rim’s action against the Salvadoran 
government fits squarely within the Harken-Costa Rica dispute model,115 and 
demonstrates the prescience of Wang’s and others’ analysis.  While Pac Rim 
has been free to allege a Chapter 10 breach, national Salvador’s 
environmental concerns, specifically as to the threat of water and soil 
contamination associated with the use of cyanide in the gold extraction 
process,116 are not defensible under Chapter 17 by mere virtue of the industry 
implicated. 
                                                                                                                   
 110 CAFTA, supra note 3, art. 17.13.1. 
 111 Wang, supra note 8, at 278. 
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 114 Id. at 278; Jenkins, supra note 107, at 299–300; R. Victoria Lindo, Note, Hydroelectric 
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 116 Zaunbrecher, supra note 11, at 496–97. 
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B.  Procedural Impediments and Insufficient Sanctions 
While a nation might be found liable for responding to valid 
environmental concerns, it is unlikely to face serious consequences for 
failing to do so.  As mentioned above, Article 17.2.1(a), the only enforceable 
provision within Chapter 17, can only be violated through a 
“sustained . . . course of action,” meaning that one-time violations are free to 
go unchecked.117  And, even [i]f a nation consistently “fails to enforce its 
environmental laws and regulations, the complaint process is long and 
involves many steps.”118   
In an attempt to respond to “the need for greater transparency and 
involvement of civil society in environmental decision-making,”119  
CAFTA’s drafters included a public submissions mechanism,120 the first ever 
to appear in the text of a FTA.  The mechanism allows “[a]ny person of a 
Party [to] file a submission asserting that a Party is failing to effectively 
enforce its environmental laws.”121  Once filed, a claim is referred to an 
appointed secretariat, who, as a preliminary matter, reviews it in order to 
make determinations as to whether it contains “sufficient information” and is 
“aimed at promoting enforcement rather than harassing industry.”122  Once a 
claim passes such threshold inquiries, the secretariat next determines whether 
further review of the submission would advance Chapter 17’s goals.123  If so, 
the secretariat advises the Environmental Affairs Council (EAC),124 
established under Article 17.5, on the matter.125  If the Council so directs, the 
secretariat is then charged with developing a “factual record” consisting of 
“relevant technical, scientific, or other information.”126  Once the factual 
record is developed and submitted, “[t]he Council shall, as appropriate, 
provide recommendations . . . related to matters addressed in the factual 
                                                                                                                   
 117 CAFTA, supra note 3, art. 17.2.1.(a). 
 118 Stenzel, supra note 18, at 687.  
 119 Subcommittee Hearing – Vargo, supra note 92, at 25. 
 120 CAFTA, supra note 3, art. 17.7. 
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 122 Id. art. 17.7.2. But see Subcommittee Hearing – Waskow, supra note 109 (“In a step 
backward from NAFTA, the secretariat charged with oversight of citizen submissions is an 
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 123 CAFTA, supra note 3, art. 17.7.4(b). 
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representatives of the Parties, or their designees.”  It meets annually “[i]n order to share 
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record, including recommendations related to the further development of the 
Party’s mechanisms for monitoring its environmental enforcement.”127  If 
this process fails to yield results satisfactory to all parties, “the complaining 
Party may request consultations under Article 20.4 (Consultations) or a 
meeting of the Commission under Article 20.5 (Commission — Good 
Offices, Conciliation, and Mediation) and, as provided in Chapter Twenty 
(Dispute Settlement), thereafter have recourse to the other provisions of that 
Chapter.”128  The Consultation precedes the Commission.129  If, after sixty 
days from the commencement of the Article 20.4 Consultation, which 
permits participation by both interested trade parties as well as “personnel of 
[Parties’] government agencies or other regulatory bodies,”130 the matter 
remains unresolved, the Article 20.5 Commission may be triggered.131  The 
Commission, “consist[ing] of the cabinet-level representatives of the 
consulting Parties . . . or their designees” gathers within ten days of notice of 
the complaint and may engage topical experts for opinions on the matter, use 
conciliation, mediation, or other dispute resolution mechanisms, and offer 
recommendations to the parties with the aim of achieving “a mutually 
satisfactory resolution of the dispute.”132  If the Commission fails to do so, 
then an arbitration panel may finally be established to address the matter and 
potentially award an assessment.133  The parties to the dispute first must 
come to an agreement as to who will serve on the arbitration panel; each 
party may propose up to seventy candidates, who must “have expertise or 
experience in law, international trade, other matters covered by this 
Agreement, or the resolution of disputes arising under international trade 
agreements.”134  Environmental expertise is not a prerequisite to selection.135  
Once again, experts may be called upon to provide opinions and, upon 
submitting written notice, interested third parties may attend the hearing and 
submit written and oral submissions that become part of the panel’s final 
report.136   
Even if a party is able to successful navigate the cumbersome 
enforcement procedures, if a country is ultimately found to have failed to 
enforce its environmental laws and regulations, a maximum sanction of $15 
                                                                                                                   
 127 Id. art. 17.8.8. 
 128 Id. art. 17.10.6. 
 129 Id. art. 20.4. 
 130 Id. art. 20.4.6. 
 131 Id. art. 20.5.5, n.4. 
 132 Id. art. 20.5.4. 
 133 Id. art. 20.6.2. 
 134 Id. art. 20.7.2. 
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million per year may be assessed against that nation.137  Despite initial 
misgivings about the $15 million cap by members of the U.S. Trade and 
Environmental Policy Advisory Committee (TEPAC),138 based on the 
economic disparity of the signatory nations and the attending 
“embarrassment of having such a penalty imposed,” TEPAC ultimately 
determined it to be an appropriate figure.139  Not all commentators share 
TEPAC’s view, however, and those who disagree point to more than just the 
low dollar figure as indicative of CAFTA’s failure to seriously encourage 
environmental protection.140  A key criticism of the assessment provision is 
that sanctions are ultimately “returned to the violating [Party] for the 
purposes of enhancing its enforcement,” and yet nothing stops that party 
from allocating its existing enforcement funds elsewhere.141  This loophole 
has been referred to as “an escape hatch that allows [violating parties] to use 
enforcement resources as they see fit.”142  Therefore, despite the “forward-
leaning” appearance of Chapter 17’s citizen submission mechanism,143 its 
failure to address a nation’s reallocation of resources upon losing an 
enforcement action (itself a Sisyphean endeavor), reinforces the contention 
that it “does not provide for any clear outcomes or actions to actually ensure 
that citizens of the region can achieve enforcement of environmental 
laws.”144  
C.  Labor’s Lessons 
A comparison of Chapter 17 to its companion Chapter 16, dealing with 
labor standards, will shed further light on the former’s insufficiencies.  Like 
Chapter 17, Chapter 16 shows deference to the nations’ own prescribed labor 
standards.145  The difference is that where Chapter 17 requires countries to 
enforce only those laws currently in existence, Chapter 16 sets forth the 
additional expectation that a nation’s labor laws will conform to those of the 
                                                                                                                   
 137 See id. art. 20.17 (noting that, per Annex 20.17, while an initial $15 million cap is set, the 
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International Labor Organization (ILO).146  Those standards include the 
rights of association and collective bargaining, along with other provisions 
for establishing “minimum wages, hours of work, and occupational safety 
and health.”147  Accordingly, by incorporating through reference of the ILO 
standards, Chapter 16 establishes at least baseline criteria for determining 
whether a nation is treating its workers equitably.  In fact, whereas 
environmental laws throughout the region are inconsistent and, in some 
nations, virtually silent in key areas,148 the region’s corresponding labor laws 
are not only considered adequate by ILO standards, but are also arguably 
superior to those of other nations with whom FTAs have been sought and 
approved by both congressional Democrats and Republicans.149 
Even free trade advocates however, recognize that the true concern with 
respect to labor standards in the region is not the black-letter law per se, but a 
subpar enforcement record.150  To address the enforcement issue, CAFTA 
established a “capacity building strategy” that included over $20 million in 
U.S. appropriations going toward fostering “ ‘labor cooperation . . . fundamental 
labor rights and the elimination of child labor, and improvement in labor 
administration.’ ”151  And, Chapter 16, like Chapter 17, provides for a 
submission mechanism to initiate research into an asserted violation of its lone 
enforceable provision, Article 16.2.1(a),152 as well as for the availability of a 
dispute resolution process in the event that preliminary attempts to rectify the 
matter are unsuccessful.153  Again, a $15 million per annum fine may be 
assessed against a party for violating its Chapter 16 obligations.  And, because 
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 147 Id. art. 16.8. 
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 153 Id. arts. 20.4, 20.5. 
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there are no restrictions under Chapter 16 on reallocating resources, “there is 
no guarantee that the end result will be a net increase in spending on initiatives 
to protect workers’ human rights or remediation of the CAFTA breach that led 
to the fine,” even though the assessed funds may be “used for ‘appropriate’ 
programs.”154   
While CAFTA’s labor chapter is thus susceptible to much of the same 
criticism as NAFTA’s Chapter 17, there is another labor enforcement 
mechanism that does not appear in the text of the Agreement and simply 
does not exist in the context of the environmental protection effort; namely, 
the interplay between market forces and elected officials answerable to vocal 
constituencies, particularly organized labor.  It is axiomatic that in the effort 
toward maximizing profits, businesses are constantly seeking to minimize 
operating costs, a crucial component of which is the cost of labor.  In a 
strategy that is colloquially referred to as “labor arbitrage,” businesses are 
able to realize greater profits by capturing the benefits of another country’s 
lower labor compliance measures and wage standards than those upheld 
domestically.155  CAFTA, at the time of its ratification, was seen as a boon to 
U.S. business managers, because within the host nations laborers’ wages are 
typically very low and workers have historically faced a great deal of 
difficulty in unionizing.156  At the same time, because the jobs outsourced 
under FTAs are unskilled labor positions, the legislators responsible for 
facilitating such cost-cutting strategies remain answerable to domestic union 
representatives, who are strongly opposed to CAFTA and other such 
agreements due to the threat they pose to U.S. workers.157  As such, there is 
arguably a greater drive to protect foreign labor interests implicated by the 
Agreement, vis-à-vis the threats they pose domestically.   
                                                                                                                   
 154 Human Rights Watch, supra note 149, at 4. 
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Id.  
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Illustrative of this phenomenon is a complaint, initially filed by the 
American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations 
(AFL-CIO) and six Guatemalan labor unions against Guatemala for its 
alleged failure to enforce its labor standards pursuant to CAFTA Chapter 16, 
which was accepted for further investigation and potential remedial efforts 
by the U.S. Department of Labor’s Office of Trade and Labor Affairs 
(OTLA) on April 23, 2008.158  The complaint alleged, among other 
grievances, that “labor conditions in [Guatemala] have remained unchanged 
or have worsened since [CAFTA] was ratified,” and that “[v]iolations of 
freedom of association and collective bargaining continue apace, and access 
to fair and efficient administrative or judicial tribunals remains elusive.”159  
After conducting an eleven-month review of Guatemala’s compliance with 
CAFTA Chapter 16, in a July 30, 2010 letter jointly addressed to the 
economic and labor ministers of Guatemala, United States Trade 
Representative Ron Kirk, officially requested the commencement of 
consultations between the two nations.160 This letter made clear that, in light 
of its “grave concerns” regarding Guatemala’s ongoing labor woes, the 
United States would invoke CAFTA Chapter 20 (Dispute Settlement) in the 
event such consultations proved fruitless.161  While it remains to be seen 
whether and to what extent Guatemala may be found liable for failing to 
uphold its Chapter 16 obligations,162 the United States’ movement from 
investigation to consultations in this matter signals, at least for the time 
being, an interest in helping “American workers by ensuring that [the] 
nation’s trading partners live up to their promises”163 to enforce labor laws.  
Thus, for U.S. lawmakers, particularly those situated in districts where the 
retention of unskilled textile and manufacturing jobs is vital to the local 
economy, working to ensure that host nations enforce fair labor standards 
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may over time prove politically crucial,164 especially during a period of 
floundering domestic employment rates.165   
D.  A Proposed Solution 
Because mining for domestically unavailable sources of precious 
resources abroad does not have a correlative impact on the U.S. unskilled 
labor market, the political interest in labor protection likely will not 
galvanize interest in environmental protection efforts.  In fact, some 
prominent right wing U.S. politicians have recently pointed to domestic 
environmental protection as anathema to the health of the economy.166  For 
instance, House Majority Leader Eric Cantor has referred to his and others’ 
outspoken criticism of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) 
policies as a component of what he considers a “legislative agenda that 
boosts economic growth through reducing the regulatory and tax burden.”167  
Although the calculus espoused by Representative Cantor and other 
likeminded politicians is arguably lopsided from a cost–benefit 
perspective,168 if not entirely myopic,169 it is clear that, due to economic 
concerns, environmental protection has become less popular across the 
political spectrum.  Representative of this trend was President Obama’s 
decision in September 2011 not to tighten U.S. ozone standards as 
recommended by the EPA, in what was the agency’s attempt to mitigate the 
easing of regulatory efforts by his predecessor, George W. Bush.170  In a 
statement addressing his capitulation, President Obama stressed “the 
importance of reducing regulatory burdens and regulatory uncertainty, 
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particularly as our economy continues to recover.”171  It is thus clear that, for 
at least the time being (and perhaps longer, if as result of the 2012 elections 
Republicans end up controlling both the White House and the House of 
Representatives), environmental protection is broadly perceived as costly and 
of ancillary importance to the restoration of the United States’ economic 
health.172   
As such, other means of incentivizing oversight of CAFTA’s 
environmental protection language should be considered.  One such 
mechanism would be the inclusion, within a side agreement that would be 
binding on all parties, of a fee-shifting provision in the event a Chapter 20 
dispute resolution proceeding becomes necessary.  This could help fund the 
efforts of citizen groups and non-governmental organizations with strong 
cases to make, which might not otherwise be in the financial position to 
conduct investigatory research and initiate consultations.173  And, if as it has 
done pursuant to Chapter 16, the USTR became involved and spearheaded 
the ultimate suit,174 it too would be entitled to recover, resulting in lower, if 
any, net cost to the government.   
A provision such as this might strengthen environmental protection 
efforts within the host nations for several reasons.  First, the cost of 
defending allegedly violative actions would likely be much higher than the 
cost of losing a Chapter 20 dispute as it is currently defined under the $15 
million cap.175  Not only would the cost increase in terms of dollar amount, it 
would increase appreciably.  For, unlike the current scheme under which 
damages flow back to the violating nation, which may reallocate its other 
fiscal resources accordingly,176 the fee-shifting costs would flow outward to 
other parties, meaning failure to comply with the agreement would result in 
real loss.  Lastly, acknowledging that progressive gestures are what led El 
Salvador and Mexico down the path to Chapter 10 arbitration with foreign 
investors,177 for host nations, stimulating the consultation and arbitration 
processes might not actually pose a Hobson’s choice between protecting the 
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environment and protecting fiscal resources.  While it is not incumbent upon 
them to do so, arbitral panels such as ICSID often give at least quasi-
precedential consideration to decisions relevant to the dispute under 
review.178  Therefore, a nation’s compelled or negotiated compliance under a 
Chapter 17 suit might carry a preclusive effect in a later investor suit arising 
under Chapter 10.     
Drafters could graft the cost-shifting language of existing international 
agreements onto CAFTA.  For example, the International Chamber of 
Commerce (ICC) Rules of Arbitration provides for a scale-based assessment 
of costs to be determined by the arbitrator and then allocated to either or both 
parties in accordance with the issuance of its Final Award.179  In fact, this 
type of arrangement has been bolstered domestically for the same purposes 
as described above, further suggesting the feasibility of such a regime.180 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Suits like the one in which Pac Rim and El Salvador are currently 
embroiled illustrate the problematic drafting of FTAs to which the United 
States is a party.  For instance, CAFTA’s investor protection language, while 
containing greater specificity than NAFTA, still fails to set a reliable 
standard for assessing when a host nation’s actions constitute an indirect 
expropriation.  As such, tribunals will likely continue to look to decisions 
arising under NAFTA, which tend to strongly favor the interests of foreign 
investors over host nations, for guidance in their decision making process.  
As further illustrated by the Pac Rim suit, private corporations hailing from 
nations that are not party to the agreement are able to avail themselves of the 
investor-friendly fora by setting up shell corporations in the United States, a 
relatively simple means of forum shopping that strongly enhances their 
chances of success in suing the host nation.  A side agreement should be 
drafted to incorporate a standard for selecting arbitral panels to ensure 
greater substantive objectivity, as well as a threshold standard that must be 
satisfied by a foreign investor in order to obtain jurisdiction under the 
agreement.   
CAFTA’s environmental protection language is also in need of change.  
The process of bringing a suit against a nation for failing to uphold and 
enforce its environmental standards is lengthy.  And, even if that nation is 
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found liable, the end result is nominal at best, since the damages assessed 
ultimately flow back to the violating nation for remediation purposes, and 
damagers are capped at a low ceiling and without restrictions against that 
nation reallocating other fiscal resources in the meantime.  Therefore, no net 
gain in environmental protection funding is ensured, and there is little 
impetus for improvement because damages are artificially suppressed to such 
a degree as to lack any deterrent effect.  The aforementioned side agreement 
should contain a cost-shifting provision to encourage greater oversight and 
participation by non-governmental organizations within party nations, as 
well as to change the currently illusory threat of damages in the event of a 
violation into a formidable one.  This would likely assuage conservative 
thinkers concerned that environmental protection is too costly.  Additionally, 
complying with judgments rendered in such suits might preclude foreign 
investors from bringing expropriation claims in the first place. 
